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1SEcrrION 1
THE BACKGROUI'lD AI\]]) OBJECrrVES O_F rrI11s S'1'UDY
The rising cost of energy and our nation's depen-
dence upon foreign oil have, focused attention on the need
for a comprehensive national energy policy. The views of
Congress and those of the President toward a national energy
policy differ; the main point of conflict being the degree
of goverrunental intervention in the petroleum industry.
The current status of policies can be illustrated by a brief
survey of recent legislations and proposals before Congress.
Provisions of the 1973 Petroleum Allocation Act
include price controls, entitlements and product alloca-
tion. [15J In August of 1973 Congress imposed a two tier
pricing plan for crude oil. Under the plan, oil from ex-
isting domestic fields in 1972 was frozen at $5.25 per bar-
rel. Prices of new domestic fields and imports, on the other
hand were allowed to seek their own levels. Under this plan,
companies engaged in refining with an assured supply of old
crude are thus in an advantageous position. This permits
these companies to buy their oil at $5.25 per barrel while
competing with other refiners that buy oil at the market
. f 1 .1. 8 n t:prlce o. arounc ~r. (~. '1'0 eliminate the advantage given
refiners that have an assure6 supply of old crude the Act
imposed entitlements. Under this scheme refiners using
more than 60% of old crude are compelled to purchase monthly
entitlements from refiners that use less than 60%. [15J In
this manner the spread betwe en the corrt r-oLl.e d price of ~!j5. 2.5
2per barrel and the hiGher market price is equalized. Fur-
thermore the cost per barrel to all refiners is the same.
In order to reduce the strain on smaller refiners (less than
)0,000 barrels per day) using old crude, they are exempted
under this Act. The last major provision of the Act is pro-
duct allocation, which provides for the allocation of product
to any buyer that the seller supplied in 1972. The product
is distributed in proportion to that purchased in the base
year.
Among the bills introduced before Congress are, "a
requirement that majors keep out of non-petroleum fuels,
sponsored by Sen. James Abourezk, D-S.D.; a prohibition
against refining, producing or transporting oil by any com-
pany that markets petroleum products, sponsored by Sen.
Thomas McIntyre, D-N.H.; pick one level of the petroleum
industry and get out of others, sponsored by Sen. Frank Moss,
D-Utah; pipeline owners may not produce or market petroleum,
sponsored by Abourezk and Sen. Gaylord Nelson, D-Wis.; a
moratorium on market expansion by the fifteen largest re-
finers, sponsored by I'/[cIntyre, Sen. Hubert .Humphrey, D-l'/linn.,
Walter Mondale,D-Minn.; and the industrial reorganization
act requiring deconcentration of control in seven industries
including energy, sponsored by Sen. Hart, D-Mich." [14J He-
cently, even Sen. Birch Bayh, a Democrat from Indiana,
adopted a pro divestiture stance.
President Ford's proposals for a national energy
policy include the abolishment of price controls, a windfall
profit tax with a plowback provision for investment, and
Jtariffs on imported oil. These proposals do not, therefore ,
directly control domestic outputs or prices suggesting that
the President believes that excessive governmental interven-
tion would serve to hinder the invisible hand of the market.
The intent of thi~ paper is to shed light on these
issues by examining the degree of competition in the petro-
leum industry through the use of concentration indices.
THE HYPO'rHESTS------ --~....-, - -
The market structure of the petroleum industry may
in fact predicate a reasonable public policy. If the indus-
try is competitive the invisible hand should operate and
cause monopolist profits to disappear through capacity ex-
pansion. The course of action then would be limited govern-
mental regulation or perhaps no intervention at all.
In order to measure the degree of competiticn in
the petroleum industry this study uses as proxies, various
concentration indices. The concentration indices for the
petroleum industry are to be compared with those of six in-
dustries known to have a high degree of concentration. It
is the hypothesiS of this paper that concentration in the
petroleum industry is less than concentration in the six
other industries selected for comparison.
SECTION 2
A COMPARATIVE DATA BASE
Defining the market for an industry is generally
done in terms of sales, assets, profits or employment. It
is felt that the distribution of these variables is indica-
tive of the market power associated with the industry under
analysis. This analysis is conducted with six 4-digit SIC
industriesl and the petroleum industry. The level of con-
centration in the petroleum industry is compared with the
levels of concentration in the tire and rubber, automotive,
airline, brewery, tobacco, and steel industries.
This study uses sales in defining the market for
the six industries selected for comparison although assets,
profits, or employment would be equally desirable. In the
petroleum industry where vertical inte~ration becomes an
issue the requirement of reporting data by segments requires
the use of assets in defining the market since sales by seg-
ment are not reported by the data sources. However both
sales and assets as used in this study in defining the mar-
ket have inherent weaknesses.
I The Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC) is
designed for the placement of data concerning products
and industries into a meaninGful system that as~ists the
analyst with studying compar-a.bLc data. 'l'heconcentration
measures used in this paper are calculated prjmarily for
industries corresponding to four-digit classifications.
Four-digit classifications signify product group or in-
dustry. F:)1' a brief review of the SIC syst~;r'.of indus-
"lrjal c1a~3ification refer to [13, 160, 16JJ.
------=~=~ 5
The weakness of sales data as it pertains to this
analysis is that conglomerate firms are not required to re-
port sales volume of 'a subsidiary firm unless it accounts
for more than ten percent of the parent firm's total vol-
ume. [8, 155-156J Therefore, an adjustment to the data is
necessary. The subsidiary firms sales were estimated from
the parent firm's total sales based on written descriptions
given in r~oody's lndustrial Ulanual, thereby revealing the
full structure of the industry. In Tables I through VI in
the Appendix an asterisk appearing next to the firm's name
indicates that this type of adjustment was made.
As an alternative to using sales the industry can
be defined in terms of assets. The difficulties in using
assets include the different valuation methods used in de-
preciating the assetS. For example, two pieces of equipment
can be identical and their original cost the same, but if
different valuation methods are used in depreciating the
equipment the adjusted book values will be different. Con-
sequently, two firms may have the same capacity but if each
firm uses different accounting methods for depreciating as-
sets one firm will appear larger than the other. An alter-
native to using adjusted book va.Lues is using unadjUf3ted
book values. This also becomes objectionable since un-
adjusted book values are based on original cost. Changes
in price levels will affect the assets' true value. In real-
ity, therefore, two firms could have the same capacity but if
each purchases equipment at different prices one would
appear larger than the other.
Most petroleum firms reported assets they have in
each segment of the industry. Where this division was not
available in the data sourc~s estimations were employed.
These estimates were derived by observing firms that re-
ported assets in each segment. Each of these firms reported
approximately one-half of their total assets in exploration
and production; one-fifth in refining; one-fifth in market-
ing; and one-tenth in transportation. Thus, for those firms
not reporting their assets on a segment basis estimations
.1'1
I
,I"
"i',were made by placing approximately one-half of the firm's
total assets in exploration and production, one-fifth in
portation. Through this type of approximation the degree of
refining, one-fifth in marketing, and one-tenth in trans-
vertical integration was ascertained.
The asset values appearing in Tables VII through Xl
ln the Appendix are adjusted book values. An asterisk appear-
ing next to a firm'S name indicates that such an adjustment
was made.
Two errors seem imminent with the data used in this
paper. The first concerns the accuracy with which the data
Sources depict comparable markets, and the second deals with
the intentional ommission of certain foreign firms. Both
errors may tend to understate or overstate the de~ree of mar-
ket concentration in each industry. Without attempting to
expound up00 conditions that must exist to constitute a specific
7market, the paper uses conventional methods and sources for
data collection commonly used in concentration analysis.
Within statistical limits this process portrays a fairly
accurate reflection of market concentration for each industry.
Perhaps the real contribution of this analysis will
come from the data adjustments mentioned above. By display-
ing the vertical structure of the petroleum industry an
attempt will be made to quantify its impact.
SEC~:'ION3
In general the consistency and ~eliability of
antitrust policy has by som? observers been considered
vague at best. This state of affairs may have been caused
by the controversy surrounding the criteria to be used in
determining antitrust policies or the political interest
surrounding their implementation.
Perhaps the uncertainty that remains as to the
ambiguity of antitrust policy can be partially resolved
through the analytical rigors of economic analysis. Concen-
tration measures are a step in thit direction. [6, 121J The
purpose of concentration measures is a comparative analysis
of different industries or of the same industry at different
points in time.
TOWARD A rrHE00Y
An appraisal of the techniques of'concentration
analysis reveals two counteracting forces. On the one hand,
the analysis is concerned with the dominance of the leading
firms (absolute concentration), and on the other, it focuses
on the relative differences between firms (relative concen-
tration). [5, 841-843J A description of these absolute and
relative concepts reveal their impact more clearly.
Relative concentration is measured by summary for-
mulas which consider all the firms in an industry and relate
them to statistical concepts of dispersion. [1), 136-137J
One way to approach an understanding of the desirable pro-
perties for measuring relative concentration is to start with
the Lorenze curve and illustrate its shortcomings. For this
purpose a Lorenze curve is shown in Figure 3-1 by line RSUV.
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Figure 3-1: The Lorenze Curve
An industry composed of firms of equal size would
have a Lorenze curve corresponding to line RV. This line is
referred to as the "diagonal of equal c1istribution."[13, 14·1J
As inequality increases, curve RV shifts further and further
to the right. 'l'h e industry cornposed of equal size firms
would reveal no concentration although there may be only a
few firms in the industry.
The problem with the Lorenze curve as a measure
for relative concentration is that a decrease in inequality
may not lead to a decrease in concentration when the number
10
firms decrease. [8, 143J For example, assume industry A is
composed of four equal size firms and industry B is composed
of 100 equal size firms. The Lorenze curve demonstrates
both industries to have the same level of concentration,
i.e., ineq uali ty is ni1. Yet conventi onal economi c reason-
ing would suggest that industry B has the lower level of con-
centration due to the greater number of firms.
Recognizing the dual impact of dispersion of mar-
ket shares on the .one hand and the number of firms on the
other, suggests that a measure of relative concentration
should be a function of both the&8 variables. More speci-
fically, relative concentration increases as both dispersion
and the number of firms decreases~
The second force acting on industrial concentration
is the absolute magnitude of big business. [4, 602J Absolute
concentration is generally measured by percentage formulas
which consider the percentage of assets, sales, profits, or
employment accounted for by a given number of leading
firms. [13, 1)6-137J The goal of absolute concentration is
to assess the impact of a "small number of large firms on
the economy." [4, 602J An absolute measure of concentration
should increase as the influence of dominant firms increases.
Out of the afore mentioned variables affecting the
level of concentration comes the controversy over the ability
of each of the concepts, i.e., relative concentration, abso-
lute concentration, to appraise industrial structure. It is
contended that absolute measures of concentration are superior
11
measures [1, 68-69J for monopolies because it is "the
dominance of the few, quite apart from the number of
sellers, which tend to influence the market." [2, 335-356J
Converse1y, it is contended t-hat relative measures of con-
centration are superior becauae "changes in the dispari ty
of firms sizes can have a significant repercussion on com-
petition in an industry even though the effects upon the
leading firms or top asset classes are minimal." [13, 137J
This controversy sug~ests that the weakness of ab-
solute measures is their inability to evaluate relative dif-
ferences in the distribution of firms; and the weakness of
relative measures is their inability to evaluate the econo-
mic importance of a small number of large firms on the econ-
omy. This controversy can be resolved by recognizing that
both concepts are equally important. Therefore, a measure
of concentration should incorporate both aspects of indus-
trial structure.
AN OVERVIE'N OF CURREIyr I'iIEASURES
It is the objective of this paper to compare both
absolute and relative concentration in the pe"troleum industry
against six industries reported to have a high level of con-
centration. To achieve this comparison three measures have
been selected. The first, the entropy index, measures rela-
tive concentration, but also is capable of being converted
into a measure that provides assistance in analyzing the im-
pact of large firms, i.e., relative entropy. The second,
J.2
CCl (Comprehensive Concentration Index), is a combination of
an absolute percentage measure and relative measure. The
third, the 4-digit index, is an absolute measure.
In view of current thought on concentration analy-
sis a measure of concentration should: [9, 143-144J[4, 602-604J
1) increase as the influence of the
dominant firms increase,
2) be a decreasing function of the dis-
persion and a decreasing function OJ
the number of small firms,
3) increase at a decreasing rate to de-
tect changes in small firms.
The theoretical reasoning behind propositions one
and two has already been touched upon. The third proposition
relates to the effect of an increasing number of small firms.
"It may" be felt that an increase in the number of small
firms should be shown in a concentration measure as an in-
crease in competitive activity," [10, 8LI-L~J but at the same
time, the economic importance of larger firms in the distri-
bution should not be overf:::hadowedby a disproportionate num-
ber of small firms. Therefore, the concentration measure
should increase at a decreasing rate to detect changes in
the number of small firms and their relative importance.
Each of the selected measures will be evaluated by
its ability to describe concentration in respect to these
three propositions. Thus an attempt will be made to deter-
mine which methodology offers the best measure of concentra-
tion.
The first measure to be analyzed is the entropy in-
dex. "Entropy is an index of the number of choices available
l.j
to the consumer where the index is the expected value of
the minimwn number of dichotomous decisions the consumer
must make." [3, 136J Instead of viewing market structure
from the firm's standpoint it examines competition from the
consumer's perspective. E~tropy is a measure of the uncer-
tainty concerning which firm a customer will patronize.
For example, in an industry composed of four equal size
firms A, B, C, and D the consumer will have two decisio~s to
make to determine which he will patronize. His first deci-
sion will be either Finns A and B or Firms C and D. If he
chooses A and B his next decision will be Firm A or Firm B.
The consumer has minimized his decisions by 10g2n = 2. The
greater the number of decisions the customer must make the
greater will be the uncertainty. [3, 137J
If an industry is coItposed of firms with different
mar'ket shares the consumer will have fewer 10g2n decisions
to make. Considering a four firm industry with market shares
of 1/2, 1/4, liB, and 1/8, the probability is .5 that he will
choose firm 1. The probability is .25 that he will choose
firm 2. If the consumer has decided to choose neither the
first nor second firm, which has an expected value of .75,
one additional decision is needed to choose either the third
or fourth firm. The minimum number of decisions the consumer
must make given the expected values is given by:
n
H = 2: Pi log2 (l/P i)
i:=l
r'l'able3-1
Evaluation of Concentration by the Entropy
hleasure: Nar~et Shares by Industry
Industry 1 Industry 2 Industry 3 Industry Lj, Industry 5
2 t: .5 .125 .5 .0625. _)
.25 .125 .125 .0625 .0625
.25 .125 .125 .0625 .0625
.25 .125 .125 .0625 .0625
.125 .125 .0625 .0625
.125 .0625 .0625
.125 .0625 .0625
.125 .0625 .0625
.0625 .0625
.0625 .0625
.0625
.0625
.0625
.0625
.0625
! .0625
2.0 2.0 3.0 2.5 4.0
"where T"', IS the market sria r-e of the ith firm in n-firmr. an
l
industry and the logarithm is to the' base 2. The maximum
value of II {,;iventhe number of firms is 10g2n and obtains
it if all firms have equal market shares. The lower bound
is zero which occurs if one firms controls the ent i re market,
that ire,when n = 1."[J, 135]
Referring to Table J-l the entropy index increases/
decreases as relative concentra~ion decreases/increases. The
measure is affected by the number of firms and their decree
of equality.
The entropy measure fails to reflect certain struc-
tural changes as illustrated in 'I'ab l.e J-l. Concentration
theory wou l.d sugge st that industry one is more corapeti tiVE:
than industry two since industry one is not dominated by a
leadinG firm. Nevertheless, the entropy measure depicts them
as both having 'the same degree of concentration, i.e., 2.0.
Entropy can be converted to a measure of inequality
to account for the effect on concentration by the dominant
firm in industry two. Relative entropy is defined as
H/lo{';2n•[3, 138] When the measure is so converted the rank-
ing of industries one and two is 1.00 and 0.86 respectively.
As the disparity between the larEest and smallest firms in-
creases, so doe~) relative entropy.
Although it is an attractive proposition that the
greater the disparity between the largest and smallest firms
in an industry, the greater the degree of concentration, the
idea nevertheles~ fails to explain the Lorenze curve pro-
bLcms , [5, 8il,JJUy ,,'lay of illu2tra'cion the entropy measures
rj'able3-2
Evaluation of Concerrtration by Relative
Entropy: Market Shares by Industry
--
Industry 1 Industry 2 Industry " Industry Lr, Inclustry 5_)
.25 .5 .125 .5 .0625
.25 .125 .125 .0625 .0625
.25 .125 .125 .0625 .0625
.25 .125 .125 .0625 .0625
.125 .125 .0625 .0625
.125 .0625 .0625
.125 .0625 .0625
.125 .0625 .0625
.0625 .0625
.0625 .0625
.0625
.0625
,0625
.0625
.0625
,0625
-
1.0 ~86 1.0 .75 1.0
--.---
1,~;- (
of Table )-1 have been converted to relative entropy mea-
sures in Table )-2, and now the equal distributions of in-
dustries one, three and five are ranked as having the same
level of concentration, i.e., 1.0. Clearly, the absolute
magnitude of concentration of industry one which has four
equal size firms is higher than that of industries three
and five which both have a greater number of equally dis-
tributed firms.
The logic of industrial concentration analysis
clearly demonstrates that the two counteractive forces are
absolute magnitude and relative dispersion. [5, 842J Due
to the inability of relative entropy to distinguish the ab-
solute magnitudes for equally distributed market shares, en-
tropy, even ta}cen in conjunction w i th relative entropy can-
not adequately represent the forces that concentration analy-
sis is concerned with.
The second index to be analyzed is the Cel. The
index is defined as:
eel = Xo +
l
n 2
E [XJo] [1 + (l-XJo)]
j=2
where
i =
j ---
n --
X zz:
1
2, ),4, ... , n
number of firms
decimal frac-tion of sales (or assets,
profits, employment) belonging to ,each
individual firm.
18
"Il'he eel represents the fractional share of the leading firm
plus the summation of the square of the proportionCll sizes
of each firm reinforced by a multiplier reflecting the pro-
portional size of the rest of the industry." [6, 121] '1'he
limits lie between unity (~n the case of monopoly) on the
one hand, and a decimal fraction whicll is always higher than
the leading firm's share on the other. [6, 121J
'I'he expression (X.)2 in the eCl measure enables it
J
to react to changes in the number of firms and their degreEc?
f di . 1o lsperslon. The real contribution of the measure is
afforded by the expression "Xi" which ona.bLes it to describe
the aspect of big business. Because of the dual treatment
of the leading finn on one side and the remaining firms on
the other, the Cel is able to describe both relative disper-
sion and absolute magnitudes. [4, 602-604J
A second innovation of the measure is the expres-
sion [1 + (l-X.)] which moderates the progression of (X.,2.J - J
This enables the measure to assign reasonable weight to the
tail of the distribution. [4, 602-604J To show how the eel
reflects different market structures refer to Table )-J.
The CCl progresses logically and in a synergistic fashion.
Consider industries 1, ), and 5. This procression illus-
trates that by doubling tho number of firms in direct
1 The mathematical reasoning for this concept was ori~inally
developed by O. C. Herfindahl by the rn easure E (X. /1..);)
whG)"p 'L~2 ~ 4 n ~~)_eo·u"~or lJ·TY1J··tc ll'(~ 'OO"t\~P0n l/rlIV _ _ , _) , , • • " 1/ _ j I..... _ v.__.... ~ _1_ _ • _ !J ....._ _-" "'-' ,,____.... ...1 i_I
in the caco of cqua I si.ze firms and un.it,v in thr::~case of
monopoly. For a review of the Herflndahl index refer to
L""lJ 15-~·' C:il "I_ ,." c, - .~ .J -t" ~ •
·'rableJ-J
Evaluation of Concentration by the CCl Measure:
Market Shares by Industry
Industry 1 Industry 2 Lnduo t r'y J Lndu st r-y L~ Lnd unt r_ .
2r' .5 .125 .5 .0625. )
.25 .125 .125 .0625 .0625
.25 .125 .125 .0625 .0625
.25 .125 .125 .0625 .0625
.125 .125 .0625 .0625
.125 .0625 .0625
.125 .0625 .0625
I .125 .0625 .0625.0625 .0625
.0625 .0625
.0625
.0625
.0625
.0625
.0625
.0625
_- ---_'_--' __H_~
.57e .617 .323 .560 .192
~. ..-- - _.--_..__---
1(;
-'y 5
,,'
1'1
il
1-- ~----------~--~-- ._--- 2()
proportion, the mea.sur-eincreases at a decreasing rate re--
flecting the synergistic aspect of the measure. Going from
industry J to industry 5 the change in the index is 0.1)6,
i,e., 0.J28 - 0.192; the change from industry J to indus-
try 1 is 0.250, i.e., 0.578 - 0.J28.
The last concentration measure to be analyzed is
the four firm index. It is undoubtably the weakest of the
three but since it is still widely used by the Justice De-
partment and the Courts it has been included here. The in-
dex defines concentration as the suwnation of the market
shares of the four leading firms. The four firm index is a
discrete measure reflecting common weaknesses of all discrete
measures. The index considers only four points of the dis-
trib\rtion. It fails to show the relative importance of each
firm. Referri to Table J-J the four digit index for indus-
try 1 is 1.0. The index for industry 2 is .875. Since the
measure does not reflect relative differences, industry 2
appears to have a lower degree of concentration. In reality
concentration theory would suggest that industry 1 is more
competitive since it is not dominated by a leading firm.
The appeal for use of the four firm index probably stems
from its eo.se of computation.
The last area of interest is the measur~'s sensi-
tl·V-l··t'J'to cn1n-ll fl'rmc ~l'l~Co ·t~e b,--d "Lf.T., l'~ l·rj(.iP)r _~..~_l an a~)so-u UL C.__ __ _. ,~ • ! co J. • _.. " v _.. t ••
lute measure it does not react to changes in the tail of
the distribution. Consequently, it is not included in the
analysis of sensitivity. In order to test the sensitivity,
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different mark et str-uct ur-es are assumed with a dominant firm
and the remaining firms equally distributed. From 'I'ab l.e s
3-4 and 3-S it becomes evident that the entropy measure is
the most sensitive to changes in the number of small firms.
Referring to the first industry in Tables 3-4 and J-S, the
dominant firm's share of the market is .2S with four dif-
ferently assumed market structures. GoinG from 100 firms
to 1000 firms the entropy measure has a 44% change and eel
has an 8% change. The entropy index is thus far too hyper-
sensitive. Under the assumed market structures, CCl gives
a better perspective. eel reflects the impact of the dorni-
nant firm while dampening the effect of the less important
ones. [S, 8!~2J
Let us now summarize the strengths and we akrieasos
of each measure. Because of its weighting scheme, the entropy
index fails to reflect certain structural changes. Consider
for equal market shares and a five firm industry where the
for example, a four firm industry with each firm accounting
leading firm's market share is one-half and the remaining
firms have one-eighth share of the market. Both industries
display the same degree of concentration with the value of
t lJ-. 2 0 L- 3 ] 38J Tt l' q c orrt ended that to di s-en ropy equa _J.ng •. ,_ _ ~ _
tinguish the level of concentration for this example, entropy
should be converted to a concept of in8quality, i.e., rela-
tive entropy. Relative entropy then computes the index for
the four firm industry as 1.0 and for the five firm industry
as .86.
The pivotal point within entropy's structure is
the weight afforded the concept of inequality. Although
some observers have found that the concept of inequality is
a desirable property for concentration analysis, it cannot
be overlooked that the conc?pt cannot reflect structural
chanGes that are similar to the Lorenze curve problems. For
the above r-caaor.s entropy and its conversi on f'orrnuLa relative
entropy cannot adequately manifest the forces actin3 upon
concentration as brought forth in the beginning of Section J.
The second area ~lere entropy is perhaps inconsis-
tent with prevailing theories of market structure is the
weight afforded small firms. 'I'hi s problem is illustrated by
the f'oLl.owi rr; example: Consider an eight firm industry in
which the firms have equal market shares, i.e., .125. En-
tropy computes the concentration index as ).00. Secondly,
consider an industry with the dominant firm accounting for
75 percent of the market and 1000 equally distributed firms
accounting for the remaining 25 percent, i.e., .0025 ma~cet
share. Entropy computes the concentration index for this in-
dustry as 3.)0. The degree of competition with a dominant
firm accourrti ng for '15 percent of the rnarket woul.d approxi-
mate a monopoly-like situation. A more likely competitive
pattern is achieved in the first industry with eight equally
distributed firms in which no firm has a controllir~ interest.
Entropy displays the opposite situation; with the eight firm
industry being less competitive than the industry with the
dcmi nant firm accoun t ing for 75 percent of the market.
') <
"--'_j
The 4-digit index selects a predetermined number of
leading firm~3 Lhus excluding the remaining firms in the in-
dustry. This approach does not allow the analysis to d~pict
the relative differences in the distribution. For this rea-
son the 4-dig1t index offer~ the least amount of information
on industrial structure in relation to the other measures
used in this study.
The eel overcomes the deficiencies that are en-
countered with entropy and the 4-digit indices. 'rhe eel re-
acts consistently to the number of firms and their degree of
d· ._1 s pe r s i on. It also offers a better perspective than entropy
in evaluating the ef'f'ect s of small fi rms on industrial struc~.
ture. In the previous example with entropy, it was con-
cluded that the eight firm Lndust r-y shooLd be considered more
competi tive than the .indust ry dorninated by the lea.ding firm
even though entropy displayed the opposite situation. To
confirm t.hi s conclusion the same example is cornput od by the
eel and the ranking of the two industries becomes .328 for
the eight firm industry and .75 for the industry dominated by
the leading firm. Better perspective is therefore gained by
eel due to the additional weight given the leading firm while
dampening the effect of the less important ones.
~HE PROCESS OF ANALYSIS
The market structure of the petroleum .indust r-y is
viewed from two aspec~s: (1) the degree of conoentratj.on
in ea.ch segment of the industry, and (2) the degree of con-
centration f'or the fully integrated industry. Analyzing
concentration with these two aspects allows the study to de-
pict the levels of concentration in each s ent of the in-
dustry and also the synergistic dimensions of vertical in-
tcgra.tion.
The first part of this section develops the frame-
work to analyze the possible impact of separate dominant
firms each controlling a segment of the industry, e.e,., finn
A controll.i 90j~ of the market in sezment one, firm 13 con-
trollinE; 90;:' of the market in :::;egmenttwo, firm C corrtroLli.
90~'~of the market In segment three, and firm D controllinG
90;;~ of the ma.r-lr e t in segr8cnt four.
'I'he anaLyt i ca.Lreasoning for this approach .is de-
rived from the fact that each segment of the industry is
ei·ther a purchaser or producer of inputs from other segments.
For example, e~;_:l)lorationa d production produces inputs which
are purchases by the refining sector that 3n turn produces
inputs which are purchased by markctin~. Selected segments
of the industry could either be monopolized, thereby ex-
torting pc1,ymentsfrom competitive :3eGments, or each ::;cgment
could. be highly corrrpet i tive, thereby maintai nine, opt irnura
technical and allocative efficiencies. This aspect would
~",~)
..... I
appear as either a high or low concentration index, respec-
tivoly, in each segment.
An underlying assumption is that each segment is
a horizorrtally integrated entity. A high level of concen-
tration in each segment is indicative of one single, or a
few firms controlling a specific segment. The eel, entropy,
relative entropy, and 4-digit measures for each segment of
the .indu st ry are corrtr-a st ed wi th the mea suree for the indus-·
tries selected as a comparison. If the levels of concentra-
tion for a particular segment are equal to or greater than
the concentration levels for these industries, the sczmerrt
is suepoct for possible anti trust eni'orcernent.
The second aspect of the petroleum industry's
structure ana Lyz ed, is the impact of vort i caI integrati on.
In t.hi s perspective the extreme is where one finn controls
the entire industry, e.g., finn A having a 90% market share
in each segrncnt. This part of the analysis is particularly
pertinent due to proposed divestiture of the petroleum in-
dustry supported by many legislators. It is felt that
through divestiture competition would increase and in tUrn
would allow the nation to move toward the coal of increased
domestic output at lower prices.
The power of vertical integration l·C',-> clearly mani-
fested by the abiLrty of a firm to control the .productive
process from the oil in the ground to the ultimate consumer,
'lnlike horizontal integration where the firm competes in
only one level of the econornjc process. Thus power stems
pr-irnarilyfrom the vertical ties tha-t;reinforce the market
power of the firm. The two most prevalent market practices
associated with such an arrangement are foreclosure of sup-
pliers and price squeezing. [1), 21)-220J The first of
these practices is present whenever the dominant firm ob-
tains all outlets in a particular product market. The na-
tural reaction of the firm is to restrict independent f'a-
bricators from supplying these outlets. The second practice
exists whenever the firm is able to subsidize one segment
of the industry to gain an unfair advantage over competitors.
For example, the fully integrated firm will sell at a high
price to its whoLesa.I.ecust orao rs and then undersell them at
the retail level. [1), 217J
The concentration measures thus far used in the
analysis are designed to depict only a horizontalJ.y organized
industry. They cannot portray the leverage of vertical in-
tegration. Now, adaptirn; from earlier studies on conglo-
merate penetration, [6, 122] a lint if;proposed which nlea-
sures the impact of vertical ties on a par·ticular enterprise
as well as the whole industry. 'I'he devise whi.ch links the
effect of vertical ties to the firm is:
where
n -
Tr =I\,
I =nlrl -.-
r .j =
number of segments
size of firm's assets in 8ach segment
size of the segment in assets
the individual firm's segments combined
eXpressect in assets
industry's size expressed in assets
'I'he coefficient "b" can be re{,';ardedas a booster
that transmits the potential force of vertical ties. Its
magnitude is based on the number and size of vertical ties
by the firm on the one hand, and the firm and the total
industry on the other.
To introduce the characteristics of the model,
two illustrations are presented with the eel; although en-
tropy, relative entropy, or 4-digit measures could also be
used. Table J-6 presents the hypothetical case where various
combinations of vertical ties are assumed. The calculations
to arrive at "b" for each firm with vertical ties are:
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When b = 1.11 for firm Cl is added to .25, the firm's own
share of the total industry, their sum equals 1.36, re-
flecting the increased weight att ribut cd to firm Cl• The
same procedure is followed with the remaining firms.
After the inclusi_on of "b" I the relative wc i ght s
of each firm must be recalculated on a 100 percent scale.
The transition can be achieved for each firm with the fol-
lowing formula:
w. + b.J_ 1a. = t», 2:b.1 +
1 1
where vt . is the weight of the ith firm and b. is the boosting
1 1
effect attributed to the vertical ties. In the case of fir~s
= . ? 5 -+- 1 .11
1.0 + 2.813
= .356
.25 + 1. ]Lj,
_-1.0 + 2.813
= J364
The adjusted weights for the remaining firms are done in a
similar manner.
The model reflects the synergistic effect of ver-
tical ties in varjous ways. In Table 3-6, firms C1 and C2
have 25 percent ma.r'ket shares and both are involved in each
of the segments represented; but, C2 is situated such that
its segment shares give it an advantage over firm C1, Spe-
cifically the segment shares for firm Cl are .32, ,16, ,22,
and .50 respectively, and segrnent shares for firm Care2
,2L!" .16,.,JJ, and. 50. In ~:_)egmentstwo and f our shares for
--~----------~--------------
32
both firms are equal, i.e., .16 and .SO. Firm C2's c~hare
in segment three is greater than firm Cl's in segment one
by .01, (.33 - .32), and firm C2'S share in segment OnE? is
greater than Cl I s share in segment thre e by .02, (.24-_. .22 ~•
The result is that more weight is attributed to finn C2, j.e.,
.364, than to firm Cl' i.e., ,3S6.
The model also illustrates the impact of vertical
ties on a smaller firm competing with a larger firm with no
vertical ties. In Table 3-6 firm Cs has 8 percent of the
market share and is vertically integrated in two of the four
segments represented. Firm C, has 14 percent of the marketo
share but has no vertical ties. After adjustjng for firm
CS'S vertical ties the weight attributed to it is .047 as
compared to firm C6' with no vertical ties, of .036. There-
fore, more weight is given to firm Cs due to its increased
market leverage through vertical integration.
The result in adjusting for vertical integration
in Table 3-6 is depicting a higher level of concentration
than thought before. The CCl which is designed to depict only
horizontal integration shows the level of concentration as
being only •L}82 whereas after the inclusion of "b" the level
of concentration rises to .622.
Table 3-7 illustrates the hypothetical case where
firms Nl and N2 have vertical ties in each of the four seg-
ments represented and the r-erna i.n i.ng firms have no vertical
ties. Also, the structure is such that each firm has equal
shares of the industry, i.e., .166. Under this structure
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we should expect the leverage of firms Nl and N2 to raise
the level of concentration. After the inclusion of "b"
the weight attributed to firm Nl increases from .166 to
.450. Since the segment and market shares for firm N2
equals firm Nl the adjusted weight for firm N2 is the same,
r.e., .LI-50. 'I'he new level of concent:cation as computed by
the eeI now equals .535 as compared to .416 before the in-
elusion of "bi!.
The question may arise as to how we know that the
model reflects the degree of industrial concentration for
an industry where vertical ties exist. Without delvin~ into
polimics over industrial structure, this study offers a
quantitative method for comparative analysis. Specifically,
this approach makes it possible to conduct an investigation
of the petroleum industry with a hjgher degree of confidence
than before. Some observers may wish to assign greater or
lesser weight to the components in the model; the original
rank of the industries remains the same. Experimentation
with the speculative cases presented earlier has given satis-
factory results.
'l'he inclusion of "b" now paves the way to analyze
the impact of vertical inte~ration on the petroleum industry.
'I'he same proc edures for ad j ust.ing weights for the eel are
undertaken for the entropy, 1'81ativ e ent.r-opy , and 4-di2;it
measures. In Table X in the Appendix the concentration
measures have been computed by adjusting for vertical inte-
c.;ration. If the indices are equal to or greater than the
industries selected for comparisonp the petroleum industry's
structure may be in violation of the antitrust philosophy
of this nation.
Section Lj.
ASSESSVIEI'T'r OF CONCENTRA'I'ION IN rI'f-IE p2;'CnOJ~EUiV[ INDUS_TEY
The intent of this paper is to probe the issues
surrounding proposals for a national energy policy by study-
ing the degree of competition in the petroleum industry. As
designed in Section) a comparison can now be made between
the market structure of the petroleum industry and indus-
tries reported to have a high degree of concentration. The
entropy, 4-digit, and CCl measures have been computed in
Tables I through XI in the Appendix. The results are sum-
marized in Tables 4-1, 4-2, and 4-). Relative entropy, the
conversion formula for entropy is computed in 'I'a.bI.e L/,_Lj,.
The following remarks are intended to provide assistance in
assessing the degree of competition in the petroleum indus-
try by interpreting the concentration measures.
The first part of the analysis explores the degree
of concentration in each segment of the petroleum industry.
A detailed comparison of each segment of this industry with
other industries reported to have a high degree of concen-
tratjon, indicates that through the petroleum industry's
transportation facilities a strong power is exerted by the
largest oil firms.
The concentration measures show that in all cases
petroleum transportation ranks high in relation to the othor
industries. Review of 'I'abl.es LI---l,1~'-2,2/·-3, and 4_L/. will
confirm this conclusion. 'I'he mo st striking results emerge
Table LI--l
Ranking of the Industries by the Entropy Index
Hank
1
2
3
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Industry
Automotive
~_'ire
'l'oba.cco
F3rewery
Airline
Petroleu.m:
Petroleum:
Steel
Petroleun:
Petroleum:
Fetroleum:
Fully Integrated
'I'r-ans oor-t at i on
Hefining
EXD1oration tc
Pr~c1uction
Index
1.96L+-
2.370
3.210
3.299
J.711j-
3.720
3.772
LI-.270
Lj-. L}SIl-
1.1-.581
.--------.-----------,----_.__---~
Source: Tables I through XI in the Appendix.
'l'ab1e Lj,- 2
Rariki ng of the Lndustri es by the L~-Di2j_ t Index
1
2
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Automotive
'l'ire
Drewery
Petroleum: Transportation
Airline
Petroleum: Fully Integrated
Steel
PetroJ.eum: ~arketing
Petroleum: Refinin~
Petroleum: Exploration &
Production
.9Lj'90
.9050
.6990
.6160
.5910
.5650
.5270
.L!.f3 20
.3920
.2860
Source: Tables I through XI in the Appendix.
Ranking of the Industries by the CCl neasure
Table )+-3
-..---'-r-------------
Hank
5
6
7
no
9
10
11
Industry
-----
Automotive
'I''i r-e
Petroleum: Fully lnteErated
Petroleun: Transportation
Drev/ery
'Tobacco
Airline
~)tee1
PotroLeum i rylarketing
}otrolcun: Refining
Petrolel~: Exploration &
Production
Index
.6Ll-80
.5760
.ln20
.LJ-060
.3820
.3770
.3HlO
.2870
.2620
• 27L~0
.1680
l- ..I . • -L.....__ ._, •.__
SOl!:£.£Q: Tables I through XI in the Appe ndix ,
39
Ranking of the Industries by Relative Entropy
11,0
Rank Industry Index
1 Automotive ·5910
2 '['ire .6066
3 Petroleum: Ful l y Inte[:rateci ·613E3
L~ 'I'o bac c o ·709()
i: Pctro1eurH: Transportation 7100J ·
6 Airline ·7360
7 Steel ·7380
8 Petroleum: T{efining ·7650
9 FetrolE~u,rn: ..larket i ne; ·774,0
10 Petroleum: Exploration ,~{;
Production ·7'780
11 Bre\very ·[;070 I
._------,_ __ L...,, ___
"
Source: Tables I throuch XI in the Appendix
!~1
for the eCI r'anking . only two industri es have a higher
level of concentration. In Table 4-3 the eCI measure for
the automotive industry is .648, for the tire industry, .576,
and for petroleum transportation, .406.
The high level of concentration for petroleum
transportation can be traced primarily to the absolute mag-
ni tudes of the leading firms. 'I'a'bLs VI in the Appendix de-
picts Exxon Corporation as owning 34.3 percent of the indus-
try's transportation facilities with the closest competitor
being Gulf Oil with 12 percent of the market. The high con-
centration index depicted by Cel indicates that Exxon Cor-
poration's market share is not offset by the relative differ-
ences of other firms.
The remaining segments of the petroleum industry
appear to have a relatively low degree of concentration.
For example, in 'l'a.b I.eIt-l, the entropy mca sur-c ranks the auto-
motive industry first with an index of 1.96l~. It ranks pe-
troleum marketing 4.454, refining 4.739, and exploration and
production 5.124. The concentration indices have mono; than
tripled, indicating a wide range between a highly concen-
trated industry and one that ranks considerably lower. A
similar trend is displayed in Table 4-3 by the CCl measure
which ranks the automotive industry first with an index of
.648. Petroleum marketing has an index of .2'71t,refining
.243 and exploration and production an index of ~168. The
8..utomotiveindex is double that of'petroleum marketing and
triple that of explorat50n and production. Consequently,
,----,,-_ ...-----
it appears that the market is more viable for these seg-
ments than for other industries.
r_ehesecond part of the anaLy si s examines the im-
pact of vertical integration on the petroleum industry's
mar-kct struc t.ur-e . Here the,measures did not show c ongr-uous
results. Di sregarding the r-ank ing of the pe tr-oLe um industry
segments in Tables 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4, the entropy and
4-digit measures rar~ed the fully integrated petroleum in-
dustry sixth with indices of 3.720 and .527 respectively.
The CCl and relative entropy measures ranked the industry
third with indices of .412 and .6138 respectively.
One reason for the conflicting results lies in the
measures' treatment of leading firms. Table X in the Appen-
di.x shows Exxon Corporation Ivi th an adjusted rna rket weight
of 36.8 percerrt. The remaining firms have a small percerrt
of the adjusted market shares with the closest competitor
being Gulf Oil with an adjusted market weight of 6.9 percent.
Entropy being a relative measure of concentration, is not
able to depict the absolute magnitudes of a small nurnber of
large firms. The measure places its emphasis on the number
of firms and their disparity in market shares. Therefore,
the absolute magnitude of Exxon Corporation was not accounted
for by the entropy measure.
Although the 4-digit index is designed to measure
absolute concentration, its reliance on only four poin'ts of
the distribution negl~cts the relative differences in mar-
ket shares. Hence, the disparity in market shares between
Exx ori Co r-po r-at i on arid the r ema inin;~; 1'i!:'m:CJis not fe1t. Due
1-
to the weaknesses of the entropy and 4-digit measures the
credibility of their accurately portraying the fully inte-
grated petroleum industry is questionable.
The weakness of the 4-digit measure is partially
overcome by relative entropy. Relative entropy considers
all the firms in the industry in determining the level of
concentration. The large disparity between the largest and
smallest firms in the petroleurn industry .indi cates that re-
lative entropy may be an applicable measure in this specific
instance.
A better perspective is given by the CCl which dis-
plays both absolute magnitudes and relative differences si-
~ultaneously. Due to the treatment by the CCl of the leadin~
firm on the one hand and the remaining firms on the other,
the dominant position of Exxon Corporation is unaltered by
the influence of the remaining firms. The levels of concen-
tration portrayed by the relative entropy and eel measures
indicate that perhaps structural arrangements prevalont in
the petroleum industry warrant furtt1er investigation by anti-
trust authorities.
The hypothesis of this paper purported that con-
centration in the petroleum industry is less than that of
industri es known to have a high level of concentration. 'l'hc
hypothesis was tested under two approaches, namely, (i) the
level of concentration in each segment of the petroleum in-
r'! 1: ,~-t- yv" ;3.1"1(} (l' 1") -""1 ""
_<.. _" •• :J '-' _ ,j ~ . - v 1 c:: imp3.ct of vertical integration on the
LI-h
industry's mar~et structure. The first approach demon-
strated that throuch the industry's transportation facili-
ties a stron(~ power is exerted by the larges t firrns. 'I'he
second approach showed that through the impact of vertical
integration a strong power is also exerted by the largest
producers. Thus these findings strongly suggest that the
hypothesis is invalid.
In view of this c:u"lalY:c"i:::;,t.n i s study concludes
that the competitive market model may not adequately explain
the general behavior of the petroleum industry. The results
indicate that the industry's priorities might be inconsistent
with the antitrust phi Losophy of this nation. 'I'her-o f'or-r, ,
a vigorous law enforcement may be deemed desirable. This
should not be construed as implying control of the free mar·-
ket system by the goverrunent. On the contrary, any justifi-
cation of antitrust enforcement should be to deter possible
anticompetitive practices.
1
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APPEnDIX
Table I. Calculation of Concentration for the Tire & Rubber
Industry, 1973
. "-r--~--'Sales
Name of Firm (dollars % L~ Digit Errt r-o py CCI-H
" 1 1" )ml_;...1 ons dO
Goodyear 'I'ire&l~ubber CO. LI,675 .432 •~'32 .521 •~'32
Uniroyal Inc. 2082 .193 .193 .4·61 .067
B.F. Goodrich Co. .66. .154 .154 .LH5 .04LI'
General 'l'ire&I<ubber 1380 .128 .128 .379 .031
Armstrong Rubber Co. 232 .021 - .117 .001
Alliance Tire&Rubber Co. 192 .018 - .101* .001
Cooper rrire&Rubber Co. 153 .014 .. .086 -
lVloHawkTire Co. 116 .010 - .066 -,
Mansfield 97 .009 - .061 -
Sh(~ller-G 10be Corp. 84 .008 - .0:56 -
Amerace Corp. 53 .005 - .038 -
Aegis Corp. 4,2 .OOL" - .032 -
Carlisle Corp. 30 .003 - .025 -
Bomaine Corp. 15 .001 - .009 -
U.S. Rubber Reclaiming 5 - - - -- .
Total 10,til 5 .999 •905 2.37 .576
-_ -_._ -----~. -~
Source: MO..QSiy' s Industrial lVlanu.alVol. I&II 1974.
Ii '?
Table II. Calculation of Concentration for the Automotive Industry
19'13
enera
----
-;- [ 4-~_i~it
Sales
f Firm (dollars Entropy CCI-·H. 11 . )ml __1ons
I Motors 35,'198 .~ .455 • 51L~ .14-55
otor Co. 23,015 .292 .292 .51 '1 .146
er Corp. 11~774 .114-9 .4·09 .409 .OLt·l
ational Harvester 4· s 192 .053 .053 .224 .005
an Motors 1,739 .022 - .121 .0Ol
Motor Co. 1,1'19 .015 - .090 -
rucks 880 .011 - .071 -
n Inc. * 80 .001 - .009 -
y Galion Corp. 50 .001 - .009 -
r Motors '31 - - - -
otal _7_8_.2.18 .999 • CJL~9 1. .9_64· •642:.......-
Name 0
Ford IV!
Chrysl
Intern
meric
White
Mack 11
Pul1ma
Peabod
QheckG
T
'I'ab Le III. Ca.Lcuj.a t i on of Concentration for the
Airline Industry, 1973
f:;211 es
Name of Firm ( do L'l a.r s --I L~-Digit Entropy CCl-i-1millions)
--;:,)
United Airlines 1726 .202 .202 • L~66 .202
Amer-i can Airlines 1209 .lll-2 • lL~2 ,400 .036
Eastern 976 ,11LI_ ,11LI- .357 .023
'I'r-a nswcr-Lc 915 ,10,? .10'1 •J11-5 .023
Delta 8'78 .103 .337 ,0Hi
Co nti rierrt.a.L 359 • OL~2 .192 .003
national JI+9 .0~'1 ,189 ,003
'ilestern J36 .039 .182 .003
NorLhwe s t 292 ,031} ,165 .002
Baniff 2'72 ,032 .159 .002
Alle,::;heny 26L~ .OJ1 ·155 .002
Nor t.h Central 118 ,01L!- .036 .001
Frontier 109 .013 .081 .001
Pan American 105 ,012 .077
>1ugh es Airlines 96 ,011 .071
Piedmont 93 .011 .071
Ozark 90 ,011 .071
'j_'8xasInternational (,2 ,009 .061
Southern 68 .008 .056
F'Ly i ng ~[lif.~er 50 .00G .OL1,li'
A'l.a ska Airways J8 .00L1, .032
Hawaiian Airlines 36 .0011- ,032
Aloha 23 .OOJ .025
Wein 23 .003 ,025
Airli ft 13 ,002 .01'7
Hecve Aleutian '7 ,001 ,009
lfew York Airlines 6 .001 ,009
I~
Table III (continued)
---:::;a1·--8. -S--r--.ldo.--T-------1t--'~ ;-,11-'-~'~-'-r)-I)'-',)r.,.-r;-(:-l-- ----p.,-,-l,
Kame of Finn (dollars 4-Digit L GL' ~--.
_____ +-.m:illions)s-:-F~.rn_ ne ;;-.: -----1---------1---------
Wright
Chi cag o Ai r-Li.ne s 1
1
Aspen 1
1Kodiak
1 -
e 5'+4 ~9J-.-~-6-:)-' ~·I---J-.-;-l--LI-. - --, -;-1e
~ __! ._'____ __ _'___ _____."----'-----....:..------J
VlesteJ~n
12.011..r:.Q_Q.: Civil AeoronalJ.tic~3 Board of Accounts and Statistics,
Washington D.C., Handbool~ .._or Airline ;3tatic)tics, 19'73.
~~~~~---------~ ~
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Table IV. Calculation of Concentration for the
Brewery Lndust r-y , 19'('3
Name of Firm
Anheiser-Busch
Heublein Inc.
Schli tz Brewin<,~;
l'.1ulsonCo.
Pabst Brewing Co.
Laba IL Ltd.
Phillip IV[orris
Carling O'Keefe
Schaefer Corp.
Olympia Brewing
Heilman Brewing Co.
Lr oq oi s
Rainer Co.
Pittsburg Bre0ing Co.
San liliguel
Allegheny Beverage*
Lone Star Brewin~*
rrotal
-_"_' ,~---_ - --Sales
(dollars % !-~-Digit Entropy CCI-H
. 1 ] . )
~~ __Till __ clO118
lL.j.)+3 .262 .262 .505 .262
723 .132 .132 .LWO .033
703 .127 .127 .378 .030
522 .095 00'" ·322 .017. / ~
1~·73 .086 - .304 .01~·
403 .07J - .276 .010
276 .050
, .216- .005
264 •0!~8 - .210 .005
236 • OL1·3 - .195 .004
140 .025 - .133 .001
137 .025 - .133 .001
44 .008 - .056 -
35 .006 - .01+4 -
30 .005 - .038 -
25 • OOL~ - .,032 -
25 • OOL~ - .032 -
20 .003 - .025 -
SL}99 .999 .616 J.299 .382-
o
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Table V. Calculation of Concentration for the
Tobacco Industry, 1973
Sales
Name of Firm (dollars 'fs L~-Digit Entropy rc~=Jv",J-.,
_ m jJ-l ions)
R. .r , Ef!ynolcJs J29L~ .212 .212 • L~7L~ .212
Bri tif3hAm. Tobacco 2808 .181 .un • L~66 .060
Phillip Morris 2602 .167 .167 ·L~JO .051
American Brands 2163 .139 .139 .395 .036
Imperial Group I~td• 1573 .101 _. • 33L~ .019
Universal Leaf Co. SLv? .035 - .169 .002
Havatampa Cigar Corp. 447 .02£3 - • 1L~L~ .002
Lowe's Corp. L~2L~ .027 - .140 .002
Rothman' C' of F'a11 NIall 37J .023 - .125 .001c>
Imasco Ltd. -:;. 317 .020 - .113 .001
General CigaT Corp. 298 .019 - .109 .001
Gulf &-vvesternLndu st rie s 200 .012 - .076 -
Helme Products Inc. 10'7 .OO,? - .050 -
United States Tobacco 100 .006 - • OL~L~ -
Standard Commercial 52 .003 - .025 -
Host International 50 .003 - .025 -
Liggett 8c [VI eyers -:~- 42 .003 - .025 -
Bayuk CiB:a.rs 36 .002 - .017 -
ANiF'Inc. ':c 35 .002 - .017 -
Conwood Corp. 29 .002 - .017 _.
American I'~aize 25 .002 - .017 -
Universal Cigar Corp. 11 .001 - .009 -
National Home Pr oduct s ~ .001 - .009 -
r1'otal 15~54? .999 .699 3.210 .377.._-.------_.
Source: I'lloodv'E) Ir1dustri8l l'iJanua1_Vol. I 8:: II, 197L~
Table VI. Calculation of Concentration for the
Steel Industry, 1973
.~--.-------_._--,---------
Sales
(dollars % 4-Digit Errtropy CCI-H
~_~-~-_------_+~m. i 11i 0n?c_,)<-+ t---. __ ._4-- _
Name of Firm
U.S. Steel 6915 .215 .215 • L~77 .21)
Bethlehem Steel 4137 .128 .128 •379 .031
Arrnc o Steel 2390 .074 .07LJ· .277 .011
National Steel 210) .065 .065 .255 .008
Hepublic Steel 2069 • 06L~ • 2L~9 .008
Inland Steel 1829 .056 .2)J .006
Jones '& Laughlin 15J1+ .0Lj·? .20? .004
Yo ung s t own Steel 852 .026 .1)7 .001
Ailecheny Ludlum 763 .023 .125 .001
Wheeling-Pittsburgh ?61 .02J .125 .001
Kaiser Steel 609 .019 .113 .001
Dominion Foundries 519 .016 .095
Cornineo Ltd. 514 .016 .095
IU Int'l Corp. -:c 500 .015 .090
Inte:clake Lnc , 460 .014 .0)6
Harseo Corp. 402 .012 .077
AIEoma Steel )76 .012 .077
Amsted Industries 3?2 .011 .071
IvlcLoughSte81 Corp. 36[3 .011 .071
CF & I Steel 3L-I-3 .011 .0?1
Shanon Stoe1 338 .010 .066
Commercial hletals 326 .010 .066
Key st o ne ConsolieJat.od 254 .008 .056
Cyclops Corp. 250 .008 .056
Northwestern Steel 235 .00'1 .050
Carpenter Tech. 20? .006 .041+
General Tire n Rubbe ,c 200 .006 .oLJ4u:
Eltra Co.,(- 200 .006 .041+
r['ableVI (continued)
:Sales
Name of Firm ( do l La r s % L~-Digit Entropy CCI-H
rni.Ll i orn
Colt Industries 200 .006 - .oLjJ.j- -
Mead Corp. -::- 200 .006 - • OL~I+ -
Lukens Steel 191 .006 - .OLi-L1- -
Jorgensen Steel 170 .005 - .OJ8 -
Comeron Ironworks 168 .005 - .OJ8 -
Alanwood Steel lLI-LJ- .OOLI- - .OJ2 -
LaClede Steel lL~O .001+ - .032 -
Cleveland-Cn_ ffs Iron 122 •ooLJ- - .OJ2 -
Florida Steel Corp 105 .OOJ - .028 -
Phoenix Ste(::l 79 .002 -- .017 -
Interprovincial ;3teel 75 0002 - .017 -
Nashington Steel 66 .002 - .017 -
Copperweld Corp. 64 .002 - .017 -
Latrode Steel 61 .002 - .017 -
Edgewater Corp. 59 .002 - .017 -
Bundy Corp. -;<- 5J .002 - ,017 -
General Steel 50 .002 - .017 -
Pittbone Corp. ,::- 50 .002 - .017 -
McIntosh Corp. 48 .002 - .017 -
ProleI' lnt'l Corp. !-1-8 .002 - .017 -
Antrhome Industries 30 .001 - .017 -
Sitkin 29 .001 - .009 -
Eason Corp.oc 27 .001 - .009 -
Union Electric Steel 27 .001 - .009 -
Basic Inc. -;<- 25 .001 - .009 -
Amtec Inc. -!~- 20 ~001 -- .009 -
Arrrpc o=P'ittsblH't((' 10 - - -vorp. - --~
'I'o taL 32,391 .999 .482 I+, 270 .28'7
__ l... -- ----
Source: Moody' § Industrjel_lManua I Vol. I & II 197Lj-.
·___"'~---------------- - ..
Table VII. Calculation of Concentration for the Petroleum Industry:
Exploration and Production, 1973
----Assets
(dollars
1::-_--------------1.1)1i 11:i 0 n s )_
Exxon Corp. 4400
Standard of Indiana 2300
Texaco Inc.
Standard of Calif.
Gulf Oil Corp.
Mobil Oil Corp.
Phillips Petroleum*
Atlantic Richfield
British Petroleum*
Shell Oil Co.
Getty Oil Co.
Tenneco
Union O~l Co.
Amerada Hess
Continental Oil*
Occidental Petroleum
Pe nnz o l L"
Cities Service*
Ashland Oil*
Sun Oil Co.
Standard Of Ohio
Marathon Oil
Creole Petroleum
Allied Chemicals*
Belco Petroleum
Imperial Oil*
Murphy Oil*
Skelly Oil
Name of Firm
2190
2000
1900
1900
1800
1500
1580
11+00
1000
1000
1000
925
900
700
700
700
700
600
487
400
400
/_j..00
315
300
300
300
.115
.061
.057
.053
.049
.049
• OL~ '7
.039
.039
.037
.026
.026
.026
.0214-
.024
.!D18
.018
.018
.018
.017
.013
.011
.011
.011
.008
.008
.008
.008
% 4 Digit Entropy
.115 .370
.061 .24-5
.057 .237
.053 .226
.213
.213
.213
.182
.182
.176
.137
.137
.137
.129
.129
.104
.104·
.104
.104
.099
.081
.070
.070
.070
.056
.056
.056
.056
CCI-H
. ---;--
.115
.007
.007
.006
.005
.005
.005
.003
.003
.003
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
Table VIr (continued)
____ .------- ------r- ..,---.-------1 .----Assets
(dollars % 4 Digit Entropy CCl-X
mill ion Q2-t__ -::---+-_-~~'
293 .008 --.056--
272 .007 .050
250 .006 .ol~4
243 .006 .044
233 .006 .01t4
200 .005 .038
.038
.038
.038
.038
.032
.025
.025
.025
.025
.025
.025
Name of Firm
~ousiana Land&Explor.
Mesa Petroleum
Coastal States
qua tine Co.·:1-
United Casino
Kerr ]V] cGee
Superior Oil
Texas Oil&Gas
Ocean Dri11ing&Explor.
Great Canadian Oil
General American Oil
elC Industri es"
Diamond Shamrock
CommonweaL'tn"
Buttes Gz.s&Oil
Amax Inc.*
Ampol Lnc s "
Clark Oil & Refining
Home Oil co ,>
['/lapcoOil
Aztec Oil & Gas
..:reneralCrude*
Tesoro Petroleum*
Kewanee Oil';}
McCullough OJ_l~'
W.R. Grace
Crown Centl~al*
Signal Companies*
Great Plains Development
200
193
190
180
165
123
120
120
115
100
100
100
100
100
87
82
80
80
80
77
75
75
72
.005
.005
.005
.005
.004
.003
.003
.003
.003
.00)
.003
.00)
.003
.003
.002
.002
.002
.002
.002
.002
.002
,002
.002
.025
.025
.025
.017
.017
.017
.017
.017
.017
.017
.017
.017
55
-
Name f F'o <irm
Inexc'obil
Mitchel Development
Global Marine
Natomas Co.*
Scurry Ra i nbow?
LVO Corp.
Pittson Co.*
Total Petroleum-:<-
American Petrofina
Austral Oil Co.
Esmark Inc.*
Husley Oil
Delhi International-~
Houston Oil & Mineral
Texas Internationsl
Helmrich & Payne
Consolidated Oil & Gas
Candel Oil
Ampol Exploration
Crystal Oil
Adode Oil & Gas
Newhall Land & Farm*
Eason Oil
Diamond Drilling
Reserve Oil & Gas
Dome Petroleum
Falcon Sea
Patrick Petroleum*
Table VII (continued)
50
50
50
50
50
50
46
45
43
36
36
36
36
35
31
30
30
26
25
24
22
22
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
------,------.~,-------~------~------~------Assets(dollars % 4 Digit Entropy CCI-H
roi IIi on§) _ .._,,_~~ -4- --i-'.-"-
69 .002
64 .002
64 .002
60 .002
53 .001
52 .001
.01'7
.017
.017
.01 '1
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
5G
5'7
------------.- ---------- Table VII (continued)
Name of Firm
Universal all Products*
Apaxhe Corp.";<-
C&K Petroleum
Denison Mines";l-
Dorchester Gas":I-
Oil Shale Corp. ":I-
Hanover Planning Co.*
Great Basins
Asse
(doll
millL
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1",A."-,,,l~l;:._.;;O:_;t~..:.h.:..:.e~-_Y';;_ ._ ..5.2
r- __~T~o~t=a=L ~~~?pO~
.----r--'-- --- ------ts
ars % Lj- Digit Entropy CCI-H
ann) ,_._ --0 .001 - .009 -
0 .001 - .009 -
0 .001 - .009 ..
0 .001 - .009 ..
0 .001 - .009 -
0 .001 - .009 -
8 .. - - -
8 - .- - -
2 - - - _-=-_
1 .999 .286 L-__5_JJ4 .168 h
Source: Moods's Industrial Ma.l}..1@_lVol. 1&11 1974.
rrable VIII. Calculation of Concentration for the Petroleum Industry:
Marketing, 1973
----- Assets ,-
Name of Firm (d!.1l3.1ars % LI- Digit Entropy CCI-H
EXXon
millions --.218Corp. 3000 .2irT ---:-4-89" .218
Gulf Oil Corp. 1100 .080 .080 .294 .012
Standard Of Callif. 1000 .073 .073 .273 .010
Shell Oil 800 .058 .058 .239 .006
Standard of Indiana '700 .050 .216 .005
Texaco Inc. 575 .Ol1-2 .193 .003
Sun Oil Co. 550 .OLW .186 .003
Atlantic Hichfield 510 .037 .176 .003
Tenneco Corp. 500 .036 .173 .002
Phillips Petroleunl"* 500 .036 .173 .002
Standard of Ohio 411+ .030 .152 .002
Union Oil Co. Ll-OO .029 .148 .0;02
Continental OU:::- 400 .029 .148 .002
British Petroleum* LtOO .0;29 .148 .002
Marathon Oil 205 .015 .090 .001
Occidental Petroleum 200 .015 .090 .001
,Amerada Hess 182 .013 .081
Mobil Oil 165 .012 .0?7
Ashland Oil 150 .011 .071
Charter Co. ~.!- 150 .011 .071
Cities Service-* 150 .011 .071
Imperial Oil* 150 .011 .071
Getty Oil 140 .010 .066
Kerr McGee lOO .007 .050
Pennzoil* 100 .007 .050
Suburban Propane 100 .007 .050
Skelly Oil 97 .007 .050
Pe t.r-o Larie " 90 .007 .048
Diamond Shamrock* 80 .006 o 0l1-4
Table VIII (continued)
r-------.------ --,_-.-----.-ASSGts
(dollars ?0
millionsJ
Name of Firm
Husky Oil*
Reserve Oil&Gas
Crown Central-:<-
Pittson Co. -:~
Signal Companies*
Tesoro Petroleum
American Petrofina*
Creole Petroleum
DWG Corp. *
McCullough OiL"
United Refining*
Dorchester Gasi~
Natomas Co.~~
Oil Shale Corp.*
Apco Oil-)I-
lUI Other,,,-__ .---------1----..£-- __- _
Total 1'3. 711. 999 L.__
1"/;·" nco Inrc_.ij,t.:l.. L, ~ •
Pargas Inc,
Petrofina
Murphy Oil*
Clark Oil&Refining
Ampol Petroleum*
Commonweal th1r
Quaker State"*
National Popane
Total Petrole~m*
Amax Inc e -l;-
72 .005
50 • OOL~
50 .004
50 .004
50 • OOL~
50 ,004
35 .003
32 .002
30 .002
30 .002
30 .002
25 .002
25 .002
20 .001
20 .001
20 .001
20 •001
20 .001
20 .001
20 .001
18 .001
10 .001
10 .001
10 .001
5
--
Digit Entropy CCI-H
- .038 -
- .038 -
- .032 -
- c 032 -
- .032 -
- .032 -
- .032 -
- .025 -
- .017 -
- .017 -
c. .017 -
- .017 -
- .017 -
- .017 -
- .009 -
- .009 -
- .009 -
- .009 -
- .009 -
- .009 -
- .009 -
- .009 -
- .009 -
- .009 -
- .009 -
- - -
- - ------
• L~29 4 •..!±.5.L~~
-- ----------~
,~\ (")
i.. ;_
'I'abl.e ,:)~. Ca lculation of Concentration for the Petroleum Industry:
Refining, 1973.
D' ., fF 1.AssetsName of Firm (dollars % 4 19l't ,_<,n;ropyCCI-H
m.iLlions )
Exxon Corp. 3500 .18-J- .183 .448 .183--
Phillips Pet r-o Leum" 1600 .084 .084 0300 .014
Mobil Oil Corp. 1~)OO .068 .068 .264- .009
Gulf Oil Corp. 1000 .052 .052 .222 .005
Shell Oil 1000 .052 .222 .005
Standard of Cali f. 1000 .052 .222 .005
Te~';acoInc. 925 .048 .210 .005
British Petroleum 900 .047 .207 .005
Atlantic Richfield 839 .044 .198 .004-
Imperial Oil Co.* 500 .026 .137 .001
Standard of Indiana 500 ,026 .137 .001
Sun Oil Co. 500 .026 .137 .001
'I'e nno o o Corp. 500 .026 .137 .001
Amerada Hess 444 .023 .125 .001
Union Oil Co. 400 .021 .117 .001
Continental Oil* 400 .021 .117 .001
Stan,iard of Ohio 387 .020 .113 .001
Pennzoil Co. ~(- 300 .016 .095
Occidental Petroleum 300 .016 .095
Getty Oil 300 .016 .095
Ashland Oil 250 0013 .081
Marathon Oil 237 .012 .077
Creole Petroleum 200 .010 .066
Skelly Oil 200 .010 .066
Charted Co. ~} 150 .008 .056
Cities Service 150 .008 .056
Kerr McGee 150 .008 .056
Superior Oi11,' 116 .006 .044-
Diamond Shamrock* 80 .004 .032
McCullo
Kewanee
OKC Cor
Dorches
Apco 01
Edingto
Oil Sha
Pauley
McMi~l
1 T~o 8~ __ L-~~~~
---
Name of
ClarlcO
Commonw
Ampol P
Mapco I
Murphy
Witco*
Amax In
Total F
Uni ted
Amer-i aa
Natomas
Husky 0
Reserve
Crown C
Pittson
Signal
Univerc
19i t .;.; J ~C~~H j
--:---- --:-025 I -
.025
.025
.025
Table IX (continued)
Assets
Firm (dollars % 4 D'
.,--. _~.ilJions ) -il 80 .003
ealth{1- 50 .003
etroleum* 50 .003
nco * 50 .003
Oil')l- 50 .003
50 .003
c. {l- 40 .002
-'etrolm.1m* 30 .002
Refining 30 .002
n Pe t r-o f'Lna" 30 .002
Inc. * 30 .002
il~" 30 .002
Oil&Gas 25 .001
'entral* 25 .001
Inc. 'jr 20 .001
Cornpan i es" 20 .001
sa l, oi i- 20 .001
ugh Oil* 20 .001
Oil* 20 .001
p. 20 .001
ter Gas* 15 .001
, IJk 10 .001
n Oil{~ 10 .001
l{'! Corp.* 10 .001
Corp. * 3 -
ian Oil* 2 -
ta)_ 19 0~~8 .oqCJ ~..t__
Source: Moo_Q,:L_sIndustri_al ~'t3L!,11al Vol. 1&11 197LI-.
.025
.025
.017
.01'1
.017
.017
.017
.017
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
.009
-2~-~
[j, .' ') • ....£..__j
',---- -- --'~ --~------------------.
"d
ill
-t>
(1j
:;"1
QrJ
(D
-f-"
~:
H
~;
o
.r·f
+"('0
H+)
s:::
OJ
o
s:::
o
o
ill
.--1
,D
d
E-I
-r=
or!
0") 0', V-\ \J1 _,.:)'- _::)- .:::)-
'DC)OOOOO
('-,000000
(~ (~ 0-J
000
000
M
o
o
,-1
o
o
1'-1
I
H
o
U
o
o
rl
o
o
I---+--~'~~-'-'---~-~~-~------'--'------~--'-----
\1'\ '.{) \_['')
0". r.....'D
M ,-1 M
0, ('-,en\ 0, if, 'D 'D '.0 M
_::} "I .,--1 0', 0', CD O~) co 'D
M rl rl 0 0 0 0 0 0
-:--1 1:'- 0" ',0
('-\ \0' rl ,,-\
i..(\ N 0-1 (\J
bJ) co 0,
\...0 ' 0
(~0
or!
c..l
I
- ,;±,-+---c------ ---~--------___:,.... ---.---- ------000rlUCO~N~~O~0,~~~~~~
'.[) 'In )0', .::} ..:::r --:r ("\ ("\ C~ ,--I ,-I ,-1 ,-1 M ,-1 ,-I 0
o 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
or-::
~---------------------------------------------------------------
,-1
cfj
-r>
0'::--j
r---- 0', \Q \Q 0, v-'!
0", en co r---- '-0 \0
o 0 0 000
co CD
n ("',
o 0
..:::)-(~ 0', G, CD
("\ C"', ('\) N C\J
o 0 0 0 0
(\1 ,-I _::)-
l.(\ .:::)- 0
C'-._ ,-1 ,-I
0, 0
o ,-I
o 0
['-._ c-. co
r---- 0 0
000
n
o
o
C() co co c-·_ -ul
r---- ['- -::7- _.::)- .c::r
H\ 0 0 0 0
,-1 Cf.J
n 0-1
o 0
N ,..,
0-) "I
o 0
Nl-""" 0
C', -::T
o 0
'If\ (~ N ,-1
('\) (',] N N
o 0 0 0
o '-.0'
C\l rl
o 0
~-:'r Nr---- ,0'
rl 0
\Q 'If\ (\1 N V)
lr\ 't.r\ i..f\ 'In _::)-
00000
'l(\ ,,-\
--:I- ..:::}-
o 0
0"\ l"-- '-0
n (\1 N
000
CJ) 0
,--I 0:)
N 0
U) N'en ,-I
o 0
r---- 0,
('\ ('\1
000
0, 0'--" 0
0-1 N .:j-
000
~ \.,~)0 N
C'--- 0', 'u"''j __:j-
o 000
.p
CD
v
~;
[1:)
0--" cO' '-.0' '.0o M M C\]
o 0 I 0
N ('\
n 0
o 0
(,-\0
:::)-N
CC", M
o ['---CO'
(r\ .,...1 '-:J
000
l-""" CO 0
(~ (", C"',
000
0) r---- \.0, ~
(-r\ ,,--I C) (,--.\
000 0
~::.:,
_::_}- C'- \.0
..:::). -:::r N
000
,-I
N
o
o \0'
N N
o 0
o ~
N ...-1
o 0
[~ C\J
0:) ~,
rl 0
Gl ~j- '-.0 co
V\ U) G) -0:::)-
000
N 0)
i..f\ \Q
o 0
C~I
OJ
r---- r---- 0, 0--..
i..f\ 0', --:::)-(Y\
o 0 0 0
0, '-.0
C"-"'I N
o 0
..:::r '-.0
N N
o 0
l-""" ..:::r '-0'
,-I (\j N
000
~ CD
rl M
o 0
("2 t"'-_ ...-!
\I, ..:::'J '-.()
000
C
" __ J::::
<J)
.--1
o 0'
or! $-.i.c. .p
o (I)
C~.-.::::
(I) or-I
.-1
o~.,
-1-"
(I)
'H
orl
rlru
P, (_)
}.,
o cH
,-1
or!
o
(J)
.--1
0'
}.I
• -,!
p, "__I
~ ...c~
0' 0
'(_) ·r-l ~~~
p,
.-1 fy
(1) 0'
.p .-1 0
s::; or-!
o (J) 0
o s::;
o or!
s::; ·IC>c: ~: or-I
(L) 0' C;
U
p,
H
o
p-, 0
(I)
(I)
())
p.•
CH
0' 0"1
.-1 ru
or-! 'd .p
o >-, ~:
cD (1.)>, cd TJ
+", ~: or-I
+' (0 0
CD -1-" ()
r_') U2 0
Ci-l
PooP~oo
:;"1 s::: r-I r-l
0' .-1 'd (I) 'U H or! or-I
U or-! H P. >-1 0 ()
o CG or-I ru 0
>=: '0 rl '0 0 r-l r-"1
0' tH s::: ,-1 '-~ crJ .--1 0 r-I
>< r--1 cd orl ru :-< ill ,D~< ~ _I·:.' .-~ -l5 (') ..'::! 0
~'_11 ,_: (:") ~::t-l 'fl ~.-! U) :_:---.-----------.--------~-~---
CD
o
"~I .C:+, iJ)
~rut-"
,-I orl
·1"> ~·I
.-1
c:
0'
-::"'1
-
H
I
f--I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
0
U
?-Jp,
0 ,-l H 'D <o 0 0J co N C'J C',- ('-- L'- C'- C'-- C'-- C'- ('- ['- C'-
~ -s: ,0 V1 u, V1 C"\ (y", (y"\ (y", ,-l ..-1 -C-1 H ..-1 rl H rl rl ..-1
.p 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0!:: · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·fL1 ..
+"
'MQD I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
'M
(~
..:::T. 0, 0, c: eel ['- -:J- '--'1 ~ ... -:f (\J ('J N ('.I C\l (\J l'\] (\J ,-l ...-i
"r-.) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
cd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0co · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·-r-l CD CD <o <o l.['. 0''\. 0 ee) ro ".f\ if', u\ v, -:J -~.-. _f (''\-c''"\
:1J ,-I ,--1 ,-I ,-I ,.-1 0 rl 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
.1-' 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0 · · ·[--t
-
(y", (", c-: 0', C"\ H N ..-1 ,-l
rO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I I I I I I I I I I
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
,. · · ~ · · · · ·
r-l '.J'\ u\ -'- (r\ N cD co l'- C'-- lo'1 l.f\ U', l.['\ -=t ...:.J't- ..:::T ..:J C"\ C"\-..j
ill c-j ..-1 ,-l ,-1 -r-I ..-1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
~-p <D 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
cD 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·.c: 8
U2 . C'- ,-1 rl rl u\ C'- C'-- -'- '-..0 ...-1_,
-r> -P 0 ,-l ,-1 ,-I H 0 I 0 I 0 I I I I 0 H I i I
ill X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.-~:~~ · · · · · · · · · ·f.-,
cD .~~-,s::: 0, (C) 0, <o 0 0'\ C'-- ,--I~,
cD I 0 0 0 -r-l I '0 0 ,-1 , I 0 I I I I , I ,
$..1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
E-" · · · · · · · ·
s::: <o C"\ 0) <o (,,1 0 OJ C"\ rl '\0 -:t 0:)
·~I bJ ,-l ,-I 0 (,j ...-1 .-; I 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 0 0 I
, I
(H s::: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ill .rl · · · · · · · · · · . · ·rYt.i.,
~-I .
O'D OJ OJ co ('0 ,-l co '-..0 \.(\ ,-l c: ,-I N CD co C"\ C'-- '\0 '\0r-l 0 H ,-l ,-l 0 rl 0 0 0 ,-1 0 ,-I 0 0 0 0 I 0 0 0p;~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
XP-< · · · · · · · · · · . · . . · . . .f- rs.l.:'--'--- l::J0
r-1
~
S S X rY.
;::i .-1 ;::i iLl G 0
ill W ill (d ill '-"'3 ;::i 0 S
0 ill '-'1 0 r-1 'd ill :'--i ::; 0
S .rl r-i r-i +) 0 ·rl 0 s=: ,-1 E ill E .
$.., r-i >- ·rl .rl cd ~ E >--, (lj 0 cd · .-1 ·rl 0.rl ·rl ~ 0 0 r-1 +_; Cl) .p r-1 ill >, ,...=1 ~ .c 0 0 UJ U
f.y 0 Q) "r"1 U2 Q) (]) 'r1 .c Q) +' U2 '-.) $.., cor-l (!) r-i s=: 0 CJ Il< 0 U Il< (Ij (]) .p U (])
ct-I ~r'~ cd (Ij 0 r-1 0 s=: [.1~ 'd 'd (j) s=:
0 0 s=: UJ .r4 .c ~~ (Ij ;:~: Cl) >, rd 0 (d s=: ill [.1. 'd ·~I
N (Ij OJ ~ .p r-I .p r-i .c (]) ~ ·rl 0 0 +) (]) +,
Q) r .-\ 'M ill (Ij .-1 UJ ~ 0 0, 'M 0 UJ 0 E ~ c-J +_; c-J>-<
L r~ ,C; .p ~ )...1 (j) CI.i ).., (]) ).., rl (f; ::; ,-\ oj cd Ul .rl ::;
('j OJ efl .r-.! S ,CI:! .-"'="! 0 0) }.., ::; r-I (]) 0 (]) 'M r- ill s=: 0'..._.....::::_._. (') .. <~ 0 t-I I~-:' rrl 0 ~ U _:.;' ~ [-1 ,.-=1 iLl (:.1 U , -_ ~ --c:
Q)
r-1
,0
(Ij
E-l
I"
H
I
H
o
o
0'\ 0', 0'-, 0, 0"-
00000
o 0 000
0'\ 0"-
o 0
o 0
0\ 0"- 0\
000
000
0"- 0"- 0"-
000
000
0'\ 0'\
o 0
o 0
0'\ 0'- 0'\
000
000
+)
·rl
oJ)
·rl
Cl
-=::r~,--+---------------------------------------------------,----
-r-o
.-1
C\l
.1-"
o
IC--l
,--/ ,-j
o 0
o 0
,-1 '\"-1
o 0
o 0
,-j 'r"1
o 0
o 0
,-j rl -e--!
000
000
,-l,....-frl~!~1M
o 000 0 0
o 0 0 0 0 0
I I
rl ,~
o 0
o 0
--I
o
o
C\J
o
o
('\]
o
o
(Y", n C\J
000
000
c'\
o
o
n (y",
o 0
o 0
C\J
o
o
C\J
o
o
C\l
o
o
('\]
o
o
C\J
o
o
C\J
o
o
C\J
o
o
(\1
o
o
-:t
o
o
'D
o
o
C\J
o I
o
-~ _::j'
o 0
o 0
,-j
o
o
----:-----:--~-
(,I rl C\J L'-- -=::)- l'--
00000 0
00000 0
C\J
o
o
C'\ (""~
o 0
o 0
n n C'\
000
000
rl
C\l
GJ -1-"
>-1 0
~ IC--I~~.
~--~--,---------------------------------------------------------------
I (y", no 0o 0 C\Joo
(",
o
o
C'\ C''\ n C\J
000 0
o 000
C\J
o
o
C\J
o
o
('\]
o
o
(Y"\
o
o
C\J
o
o
C\J
o
o
(\)
o
o
C\J
o
o
C/) •
+-'
-p ~
Q) 2'~:~r----r--------------------------------------------------.---------->-, •
l\J c:~~~ m
>--1
[~-I
('\]
o
o
C\J
o
o
s:::
'r'l b:
(1-1 e
GJ '~I
r:r::
I I
,-j
o
o
C\J
o
o
C\J
o
o
C'\ C'\
o 0
o 0
('\]
o
o
C\J
o
o
~J. ..
O'D
r-l 0
p-, >-1
>< p"I-~C:r.;:.l_+ . - ._- _
EO s:::
~ l\J
~ Q) 0 W
Ul s::: .-I·rl 'r1 GJ .-1
l\J oc-I ~ O· >-1 0 .rl l\J
~ ~ 0 Q) ~ ~
rl· ~ 0 EO ~ -f-" -F'
l\J 0 rl ,-1 Q). ocr:: Cw Ul s::: ,-1
Q) :=: ·,-1 ·~I p-< 0.-1 ~ ~ Q) 'r1 s::: s::::
3: H 0 0 C~·rl.-I 0 TJ U 1]) 0 [\) ru
):": Q)HO rurl s::: cd PO
Ul s::: 0 r-I "y, 0 .-1 ~-I r'--I H s::: 2 >, >-1 .,-1
C\l C\l EO 0 ~ 0 0 X GJ GJ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ~
~~ Q) E'. p-, eel p-, Q) (,J S Coo 0 +, UJ ,0 (l)
(J) () 0 i.-'-: ;-1 cel >--, E; 0 Q) U H ~ ru :::; :_j 2
;-~',J~,_l2_,'-·'~-_(_L?.i_Q~ __~j ~-~-,U C.) ~::, :T: C'L .~t!------------------------------
If-i
o
n C'\ n C'\ tr\
00000
00000
("
o
o
C'\_::)-
o 0
o 0
C'\ (\.I
o 0
o 0
C\J
o
o
C\J
o
o
V\
o
o
iF\
o
o
o
u
'r"1
o
o
ru
s:::
Q) 'r-I
s::: CH
CD 0
p-, ~
o ~
~ GJ
{'I-I (l,
0)
s:::ru
.-1
o
>--1+-j
C)
p.,
------ ----- --~ --- ,-~--~
_--'" 0
(\j
H 1 I I 1 I I : I ,-I1 I I 1 1 1 ..:j-
H ·
U
0 ->, 0
P; (\j
0 1 1 1 1 I I I I
L"-
).._j I I I I I
+., c:-
s::::
roLl
+"
0
r--.
·d 1 I 1 1 I I I ~bJ) I I I I 1 1
.r-! ·0
_:j- -~
· 0'r-_' I I I I 0'
'U I I 1 1 I 1 I I
1
cD ·
r-l ..--1 -r-' 1 ,-I rl ~j ,-j rl v-' 1
,-1 0
cd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
I 1 (\j
+" 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
0 · · · · · · · · · ·~-I
0
..:j-
cO I I 1 1 I I 1 1 I 1
1 1 1 0·,--I
,--j ,-1 ..--1 .... 1 .,·-1 -r-I rl ..--1 ... 1 ",-I
0 0
TJl cd 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 I
(\j
~
QJ -f-> 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
$...1 0 · 0 · · · · · · · · ·c-J E~-I
.c: -
en · , ,--I (\j ,..-1 (\j V\ ..--1 0' (-<' 0'-1-" 0 0 I 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 I 0 ,-1 25
+" ~~ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
QJ ~s · · · · · . . · ·, ~; -.-I---
$...1 ·cD s::.: 0
2:--':: cD I 1 I 1 I 1 1 I I I I I I g"1 $...1
E-1 ·
s:::: rl rl ,-j ~I (\j (\.J (.,-, co 0
.r-! bJ 0 0 1 0 0 I I 0 I 0 0 I ..--1 0CH s:::: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o-
CD·~I · · · · · . . · ·rc:: -
$...1 .
o Tj (\j ..--1 (" (\j ..--1 0.1 (\j «-I cr Cl'
r-l 0 0 0 0 0 0 c 0 0 I 1 I I \,Q 0
P,$.-I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0:x: p.. · · · · · · · · · .,ft.l
TJl
QJ TJl 8 b.D
.r-! cD Ul ;::i r.::
s:::: c) cd Ul 0) (I) .,j
c ('0 "CJ CJ · co 'd r-l r.:: OJ>~$...I 0-, r-l c?J 0 0 ::> 0 · ·,....1 +'.r-! 8 .,j r--1 0 L';~~ $...I $...I U C;-I . cll .-1
(ic, 0 0 o,j .::, u +" c: Q) o -j-C> H (1j
U 0 c: .,j 0) 1--1 ~..c: r.:: [/2 QJ +-)
1:;", QJ QJ 0 0 r-I P. 1--1 .c: 0
0 r-l :> tn QJ +" (1j w 'U ~< +" E--I
cD H QJ r.:: Ul 6 H r-l CD QJ (') OJ 0
CD c: QJ -P ~j -/-" QJ 0) cd CJ -P U ,!::::!
f' U] -1-" .:,.. +, -/-" c: _1_1 ::-1 ·,....1 +., (1j r-\>-(\5. C)::5 ,(J) tr-l t.J (ll 0 ru C: ·,.---1 :-:) r-\":-_ I ," I"'~ rn ',,-' (l ~" T' '::"'1 p_. ::.J '-,,- r~
~ ..*.........""_ .•_' _,_-'_-_' '__ ' .:1...-._:.:.j ....._.,;l-- ......~--- ____ ' _'_._.;.. '" - ..-
r-:
,.0
cd
E-
><
H
'DC:
cd
H
H
H
"-
,0>
H
H
:>
H
:>
c:
QJ
~
cd
-/-"
Ul
QJ
$...1
cD..c:-w
(D
U
>-1
::::i
o
en
-------.-~- ---------_-_----- - -----,--~-
Table XI. Calculation of Concentration for the Petroleum Industry:
Transportation, 1973
Name of Firm
Assets I(dollars % 4 Digit Entropy CCI-H
millions) I
2000 .343 I •31~3 .53'1 .343
'(00 .11.::u .120 .369 .027
400 .068 .068 .264 .009
350 .060 .060 .245 .007
220 .038 - .175 .003
220 .038 - .176 .003
200 .034 - .166 .002
18L~ .032 - .159 .002
173 .030 - .152 .002
156 .027 - .141 .001
150 .026 - .137 .001
105 .018 - .10~, .001
100 .017 - .100 .001
100 .017 - .100 .001
100 .017 - .100 .001
91 .016 - .095 .001
90 .016 - .095 .001
7L} .013 - .081 -.
52 .009 - .061 -
50 .009 - .061 -
50 .009 - .061 -
50 .009 - .061 -
32 .005 - .038 -
20 .003 - .025 -
20 .003 - .025 -
20 .003 - .025 -
20 .003 - .025 -
20 .003 - .025 -
20 .003 - .025 -
_- -
Exxon Corp.
Gulf Oil
Standard of Indiana
Coastal States-;"
Shell Oil
Atlantic Richfield
Continental Oil-:'
Standard of Ohio
Standard of Calif.
rrexaco Inc.
Getty Oil
Sun Oil Co.
Phillips Petroleum*
British Petroleum
Creole Petroleum
Amerada Hess
Marathon Oil
HO'1leOil Co.':}
Imperial Oil-;(-
Kerr McGee
Union Oil Co.
Ashland Oil
Tenneco
Cities Service-::-
Clark Oil & Hefining
Cormnonwoajt.h>
Ampol Petroleum*
Mapco Petroleum*
Occidental Petroleum*
~, ..------- - - ---
_ c:- -- ----_
Table XI (continued) __ "_, __ ,...- ...,.- ___~
Assets
Name of Firm (dollars % 4 Digit Entropy CCI-H
.--- millj,.Qll§.l.Gulf Interstate Co. 15 .003 .025
Husky Oil* 10 . .003 .025
Natomas Co. 10 .003 .025
[Amax Inc. * 10 .003 .025
Crown Central* 10 .003 0025
Tesoro Pe t r-oLeum" 3 .001 .009
Edingtom Oil-:r 3 .001 .009
Pauley Pe t r oLeum" 1
Anco Coa. -:l- 1 - -- _._----"
'l'otal _3lUQ._ _2.. • 591 ? 2 •!~06
Source: MO_Q_dy's Industrial Manual Vol. 1&1 I 19'74•
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